In a 1998 article entitled, "Winning at Change," Harvard Business School Professor Leadership, John P.
Kotter, identified management errors that explain most cases of organizational failure when it comes to corporate transformations.
These errors are not limited to the corporate world.
They can apply to any entity seeking to bring about big change in a demanding environment.
With Election 2006 fast-approaching, the U.
S.
in a stalemate in Iraq, the Taliban coming back in Afghanistan, and North Korea and Iran pushing ahead with their nuclear weapons programs, two of those errors stand out with respect to the ongoing credibility crisis that has all but transformed President Bush into a lame duck.
That transformation could be completed should one or both Houses of Congress change hands following the upcoming elections.
Talking too much and saying too little.
Kotter explained, "An effective change vision must include not just new strategies and structures but also new, aligned behaviors on the part of senior executives.
Leading by example means just that...
" He then warns, "It doesn't take much in the way of inconsistent behavior by a manager to fuel the cynicism and frustration of his or her direct reports.
" In the case of President Bush, saying too much of what later proved inaccurate--though not necessarily by design as some political opponents might argue--has undermined his credibility to the point that, since last autumn, opinion polls have consistently suggested that he is not "honest and trustworthy.
" That public judgment concerning President Bush's character could well contribute to a change of power in the House of Representatives, Senate, or both.
The White House's repeated claim that there was a agreement within the Military with regard to troop levels did not properly portray that there was never a full consensus over manpower.
Recent developments and earlier testimony show that major differences of opinion over manpower existed even before the Iraq war.
In February 2003, U.
S.
Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki warned the Senate Armed Services Committee that success in a postwar Iraq might require several hundred thousand troops.
In early September 2003, U.
S.
General Ricardo Sanchez warned, "If a militia or an internal conflict of some nature were to erupt, that would be a challenge out there that I do not have sufficient forces for.
" On October 6, 2004, the Boston Globe revealed, "One senior military officer who served in Iraq last year said...
that the Bush administration's contention that the military got all the troops it wanted is not accurate.
'It was pretty plain that we did not have enough troops there,' said the officer, who asked not to be named for fear he would be punished by superiors for his comments.
'I am surprised that the reaction of the administration has been that we received all the troops asked for.
The original plan called for another Army division, and someone made the decision we were not going to get it.
'" At the same time, U.
S.
assessments of the on-the-ground situation in Iraq proved far too rosy.
In general, progress was consistently overstated and risks and setbacks were consistently understated or denied.
Often, the Media was accused of focusing on the wrong stories.
Today, there no longer is a dispute among the American public over which assessments were accurate.
Iraq is in bad shape.
It is not a democracy and its security situation is deteriorating.
Beneath the surface of rising sectarian violence lurks the possibility of a highly destructive civil war.
Even as the insurgency gained force, White House and Pentagon assessments focused largely on inputs rather than outcomes.
Inputs include, among other things, the number of Iraqi troops trained.
Inputs tell part of the story.
However, outcomes measure how well the resources are being applied.
Crucial information concerning the number of terrorist attacks, casualties, arrests made, convictions rendered, etc.
, was not provided.
Some within the Bush Administration even dismissed such statistics as not being good measures of performance.
Their argument was that such figures could be skewed by terrorists successfully carrying out attacks.
But that is what such statistics are supposed to measure--whether or not Iraq is secure.
The purpose of such information is to allow those responsible for security to build an environment in which the risk of terrorist attacks and other acts of violence is minimized.
Had more attention been paid to outcomes and robust measures undertaken to address the rising violence early on, the situation might never have gotten to its present state.
Declaring victory before the war is over.
Kotter explains, "When a project is completed or an initial goal met, it is tempting to congratulate all involved and proclaim the advent of a new era.
" He then warns, "While it is important to celebrate results along the way, kidding yourself or others about the difficulty and duration of organizational transformation can be catastrophic.
" On May 1, 2003, President Bush did just that.
Onboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, he proclaimed, "Major combat operations in Iraq have ended.
In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed.
" He was right that at that time major combat operations had ended.
Had he stopped there, there would be no controversy over his "Mission Accomplished" speech.
He did not.
He was badly premature in asserting that the United States and its allies had prevailed in Iraq.
Given recent experience with suppressed ethnic rivalries that reignited at the death of Josip Tito in Yugoslavia and the breakup of the Soviet Union that followed the fall of Communism, the historic experience suggested that it was far too soon for any such declarations.
Instead, the most difficult and dangerous tasks were still ahead.
On December 18, 2005, President Bush again all but declared victory.
Then, he stated, "Our forces in Iraq are on the road to victory--and that is the road that will take them home.
" He then predicted, "In the months ahead, all Americans will have a part in the success of this war.
" The months ahead brought no such "success" and the "road to victory" appears, instead, to have led to a cul-de-sac of endless violence.
In fact, ten months later, the security situation in Iraq has deteriorated substantially.
In his article, Kotter recounted, "I met recently with a capable, intelligent management group that has begun to see encouraging results in a difficult initiative.
They are only six months into what is probably a three-year process--but are already talking about 'wrapping this thing up in a few months.
' Such talk is nonsense.
" Today, arguments that the U.
S.
is "on the road to victory" in Iraq are greeted as "nonsense" in public opinion polls.
A survey conducted by Newsweek on October 5-6, 2006 found that just 29% of those surveyed said that the U.
S.
is making progress in Iraq, while 64% said it is losing ground there.
On account of the two basic errors that Kotter had identified in his article, the Bush Administration is now in the throes of a major credibility crisis.
Bad as the electoral consequences might be for the President--the prospect of a change of power in the Congress in November's election will impede his ability to pursue policies he seeks to implement--the loss of credibility could have even worse policy implications for the United States as a whole.
Already, Iran and North Korea believe the U.
S.
lacks credibility and the military and diplomatic means to compel them to comply with international demands to abandon their nuclear weapons programs.
As a consequence, they remain in defiant pursuit of their nuclear weapons programs.
The U.
S.
increasingly urgently needs tangible positive results in Iraq, if it is to stem its geopolitical and credibility losses.
Failure to bring about such outcomes will likely further damage U.
S.
influence.
Later, a lack of progress will likely lead a new Administration to embrace a full-fledged withdrawal from Iraq, even as that decision would impose substantial additional geopolitical costs.
Kotter warns, "A compelling vision that produces few results usually is abandoned.
" Hence, after January 20, 2009, if there is not a dramatic turnaround in Iraq or evidence that such a turnaround is reasonably imminent, a new President might well choose to terminate that project, try to limit the geopolitical damage that would result from such a decision, and focus U.
S.
efforts and resources on the narrower and still largely attainable task of salvaging Afghanistan's reconstruction.
Credibility is, indeed, a terrible thing to waste.